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What inﬂuence does track record have on the probability that a ﬁrm will issue pub-
lic bonds? Using a simple two-period static model we motivate our empirical study of
bond issuance decisions in the United States, controlling for various sources of third-
party certiﬁcation of quality that can assist access to markets. After isolating seasoned
issuers with high and sustained market implied bond ratings from other types of ﬁrms,
we ﬁnd that these ﬁrms ﬁrms are 20 per cent more likely to issue a bond than other
ﬁrms. This suggests ﬁrms may have an incentive to invest in their track record in order
to improve market access and lower their cost of ﬁnance.
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11 Introduction
According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) over the
period 1996 to 2010 the volume of US corporate bonds outstanding more than tripled from
$2.1 trillion to $7.5 trillion (see Figure 1). The same body reports that the ratio of US
total corporate debt to common stock issuance has risen from 2.9 times equity issues in 1996
to 5.1 times in 2010.1 Very recently, corporate treasurers issued $1063 billion of corporate
bonds in the United States in 2010 – higher than the $902 billion of corporate bonds issued
in 2009, and a big increase on the $701 issued in 2008 – as interest rates fell to historic
lows. But not all ﬁrms were in a position to beneﬁt from these unusual conditions. We
know that riskier ﬁrms typically have to pay more to compensate investors for the higher
risk of default, which is consistent with the observation in Bernanke et al. (1999) that ﬁrms
with lower creditworthiness face higher external ﬁnance premiums.2 In general, ﬁrms that are
smaller, riskier and more opaque will borrow less (Faulkender and Petersen (2006)), and may
have limited options for raising external ﬁnance (Cantillo and Wright (2000)). Moreover,
Erel et al. (2012) highlight how capital raising varies through the cycle with diﬀerences in the
quality of borrowers aﬀecting the type of securities oﬀered at diﬀerent stages of the business
cycle. All of these factors have undermined the case for some ﬁrms to issue in US public
bond markets.
To extent that ﬁrms suﬀer from asymmetric information problems highlighted by Dia-
mond (1991), it is diﬃcult for them to attract ‘uninformed investors’ to purchase their debt
securities. So what can be done to reassure these uninformed investors? One factor that
mitigates the adverse eﬀects of information asymmetry is a track record of repayments of
previous debt contracts. If ﬁrms can show they have a history of successful bond issues in
1This calculation does not include convertible debt, asset and mortgage backed securities which would
increase the multiple even further.
2This is true for both bond and equity markets. For instance, Campello and Chen (2010) address risk
pricing in equity markets. They report evidence that equities of ﬁnancially constrained US ﬁrms in the
Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database command higher ex ante excess risk premia and these premia
move countercyclically with economic and ﬁnancial conditions.
1the past, they may attract investors. Moreover, third-party certiﬁcation of quality can assist
this process, for example, Suﬁ (2007, 2009) shows that a loan rating helps a ﬁrm gain access
to uninformed investors in the syndicated loan market. But how much does this matter and
to what extent does it mitigate the eﬀects of asymmetric information?
We intend to consider this matter by looking at several measures of track record which
could inﬂuence the probability that a ﬁrm will access the public bond market.3 We look at
the ﬁnancial health of the ﬁrm, reﬂected in the quality of its balance sheet. Then we consider
the track record in related markets for external ﬁnance such as loan markets or private bond
markets. Finally, we observe the ﬁrm’s participation in the public bond market over recent
history and the market implied rating of the bonds that were issued, which together provide
information on the ﬁrm’s record in the market in which it seeks to issue securities. We expect
the ﬁrm to issue bonds more readily if it has an issuance history and good quality bonds,
than if there is a poor history or no history to provide information to investors, therefore
we compare ﬁrms that are seasoned in the public bond markets versus ﬁrms engaging in an
IPO, and those with investment grade as opposed to sub-investment grade bonds.4 An issue
of particular interest to us is whether the record in the bond market matters to ﬁrms that
have already acquired a record in other markets e.g. loan markets or private bond markets.
Our paper begins with a conceptual framework, based on a two-period static model
similar to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). This provides a framework for considering how a
track record acquired in the ﬁrst period can aﬀect access to market ﬁnance in the second
period. It is not fully dynamic, however, and one of the conclusions we draw from our
empirical analysis – which shows that track record matters, and is worth investing in –
is that the theoretical models used for analyzing decisions to participate in bond or other
3We focus on the public bond market because it is the largest of the markets for external ﬁnance, greatly
exceeding private bond markets, convertible debt and equity markets, private equity and common stock. A
comprehensive assessment of the choice between these markets is provided by Gomes and Phillips (2012),
who document the choices that ﬁrms make between markets and between types of security. There are many
similarities between their paper and our own, although this paper concentrates on the value of track record
in gaining access to the public bond market.
4Covitz and Harrison (2004) and Gomes and Phillips (2012) have used previous exposure to the market
as an explanatory variable for rating transitions and market choice respectively.
2markets need to be dynamic to capture this feature.
Our empirical work is based on an assessment of the probability that a ﬁrm will issue a
bond using an unbalanced panel of 983 US listed ﬁrms that issued dollar denominated bonds
from 1995-2004. We merge data from diﬀerent sources including Bloomberg, Datastream,
Standard & Poor’s CreditPro database and Thomson Financial One Banker using ISIN codes
in order to link bond- or bank-speciﬁc data with accounting data for the ﬁrm. A probit
model examines issuance probability for ﬁrms with diﬀerent balance sheet characteristics
and exposure in other markets such as loan and private bond markets. Then we separate
ﬁrms using transition matrices to identify good quality issuers as those whose bonds ratings
are investment grade and have not been downgraded in the sample, from others.5 This
eliminates ‘fallen angels’ and isolates ﬁrms with steady or improving credit ratings. There is
some similarity here with the ratings upgrades and downgrades used by Covitz and Harrison
(2004) to measure of changes in credit quality. Using previous exposure to the bond market
and quality we ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of a ‘good track record’ in the public bond market
raises the probability of issuance, even after taking into account other inﬂuences on the
decision to issue discussed previously.
The paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we show that the track
record of successful, investment-grade corporate bond issues has a very important inﬂuence
on the ﬁrm’s decision to issue. Second, we ﬁnd that track record still matters even in the
presence of other indicators of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial history in the form of a past history of re-
peated, successful loans under the same lead arranger, a history of private bond placements,
5Quality of the issues is measured by investment or sub-investment grade status in the bond market and
is derived from information on downgrades of credit ratings from market implied bond ratings (MIBRs)
using a method developed by Servigny and Sandow (2007). The ratings agencies such as Standard & Poors,
Moody’s and Fitch Ratings provide issuer default ratings based on a through the cycle methodology, that
are reviewed periodically, but do not reﬂect current business cycle conditions. Moody’s and Fitch ratings
also supply market implied ratings that oﬀer point in time measures of the rating of a ﬁrm, based on equity
or CDS market information. We use market implied ratings—derived from bond market information—for
their more timely nature and ability to reﬂect current market conditions. We anticipate that the chosen
rating level for each corporate bond will be similar, and neither measure is likely to misclassify ﬁrms across
the investment grade boundary. We also think that ratings downgrades will eventually be reﬂected in all
types of ratings, but market implied ratings will give an earlier signal.
3and high grade public bond issuance. Therefore we conclude that participation in markets
for loans and private bonds as well as public bond issues all contribute to the certiﬁcation of
quality of the ﬁrm in the eyes of uninformed investors. Each level of additional information
increases the probability of issuance after controlling for other factors, including the ﬁrm’s
issuer default rating. These ﬁndings are robust to many alternative speciﬁcations and con-
trols. Third, ﬁrms that issue have stronger balance sheets, and consequently better ratings
from the credit rating agencies, and would have had time to build a track record of success,
conﬁrming the observation by Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Suﬁ (2007) that more
transparent ﬁrms obtain greater debt compared to opaque ﬁrms. This also suggests that
ﬁrms with positive private information behind the publicly observable balance sheets are
more likely to issue than ﬁrms with negative private information, see Covitz and Harrison
(2004).
The next section presents a modelling framework that motivates our empirical work in the
sections that follow. Section three describes the data, methodology, and data characteristics.
Section four reports the estimation results and robustness checks and section ﬁve concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
There are several models that study the role of net worth in the choice between alternative
modes of ﬁnance as for example in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Repullo and Suarez (2000),
Hoshi et al. (1993). Other researchers have examined the co-existence of bank and bond
ﬁnancing (see for example Bensanko and Kanatas (1993)) and the choice between bank
loans, direct debt and equity ﬁnance (see Bolton and Freixas (2000)). The decision to issue
public debt is a ﬁnancially signiﬁcant step for the ﬁrm that provides new opportunities for
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility (see Rajan (1992) and Pagano et al. (1998)) and lowers the cost of bank
ﬁnance, but it also weakens monitoring capability since public debt is arms-length ﬁnance
(Leland and Pyle (1977)) and this can send a negative signal to markets (Datta et al. (2000))
4reducing the share value. The decision to make this step is made by balancing the positive
and negative eﬀects, and for certain types of ﬁrms e.g. older and larger ﬁrms or those with
growth opportunities (see Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Datta et al. (2000)) there are
signiﬁcant beneﬁts from issuing bonds. Diamond (1991) has argued that a track record of
repeated borrowing from banks improves the likelihood that a ﬁrm will be more inclined to
oﬀer public debt in the market.6 Alternatively, establishing a track record from successful
issues in the bond market may provide yet another informational advantage to the issuer in
the sense of establishing and maintaining a signal of quality in the eyes of investors.
2.1 An illustrative two-period static model
Since our main goal is to illustrate the role of quality signals on market ﬁnance we present an
illustrative two-period model similar to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in which the outcome
of the ﬁrst period inﬂuences the ﬁnancing outcome of the subsequent period (hence a role
for quality signals).7
Corporate sector. Suppose there is a continuum of ﬁrms with net worth A. The
set of all ﬁrms is described by a cumulative distribution function F(A). Each ﬁrm owner
is risk neutral and has an investment project that costs I to implement. Projects can be
undertaken at any scale, i.e. I 2 [0;+1), but I always exceeds A. The project has the
following characteristics. It succeeds with probability p generating a return R(I) = RI
(i.e. proportional to I), and fails with probability 1   p generating zero income, where the
probability of success p depends on the diligence of the owner. Consequently, p = ph if the
ﬁrm owner manages the project to the best of her abilities, and p = pl < ph otherwise. In
6Altman et al. (2010) conﬁrm that banks, as insiders, have superior information to public debt holders,
especially when loans are traded on secondary markets, and therefore information acquired from the loan
market may be a good signal of quality for bondholders.
7With two periods, the link between them is that ﬁnance in the second period depends on the outcome
of the ﬁrst period i.e. whether the project is successful and the return to the bond holder is positive. If this
is the case ﬁnance is made available in the second period. This introduces a role for building “reputation”
from quality signals because repeat issuance occurs when a ﬁrm does not default on the bond in the earlier
periods. Moreover ﬁrm characteristics are also important since initial access to ﬁnance depends on whether
the net worth of the ﬁrm exceeds some cutoﬀ level. This is however a step short from a fully dynamic model
in which the ﬁrm’s continuation value increases with greater ”reputation”.
5the latter case the ﬁrm owner enjoys a private beneﬁt. We assume the owner can choose
between a project with a high probability of success, ph that yields no private beneﬁt, and a
project with a low probability of success, pl that yields a private beneﬁt. The private beneﬁt
is proportional to investment scale I, that is, (B(I) = BI;b(I) = bI)withB > b > 0 and
is private information to the ﬁrm owner. All other details of the economic environment are
common knowledge between all parties.
Financial sector. There is a continuum of lenders. Lenders can either be bond holders
(investors) or intermediaries (banks).8 Lenders are risk neutral. Perfect competition among
lenders ensures ﬁrms face a perfectly elastic supply of funds and lenders just break even.
Financing projects. Given A < I the ﬁrm needs to raise I   (A   c) from investors
(through directly placed issues) or I  A from intermediaries (intermediated ﬁnance), where
c is a ﬁxed cost assumed to be independent of issue size. We assume that bond holders (the
“market”) demand an expected rate of return equal to rm. Intermediaries demand a rate
of return per unit loaned equal to rb  rm, which exceeds rb due to monitoring costs i.e.
resources spent on monitoring the ﬁrm’s management.9 An implication of monitoring is that
banks can reveal whether the ﬁrm is b or B type. On the other hand, c captures the (ﬁxed)
underwriters’ fees that are normally associated with public debt issues. For our purposes
the assumptions on the cost of ﬁnance (rm;rb;c) create a choice between bank or market
ﬁnance. For relatively small ﬁnancing needs ﬁrms are most likely to use a bank in order to
avoid the ﬁxed cost, while for large scale ﬁnance issuing directly is preferable.
Beliefs and signals of quality. We now come to the role of signals from various
ﬁnancial markets. In contrast to intermediaries, investors only observe the ﬁrms’ track
record (success or failure) but not the private beneﬁt (B or b). They form (and update)
a belief – equivalently a rating – about ﬁrm reliability based on this information. We can
8We use the terms investor and bond holder interchangeably.
9A higher cost of bank ﬁnance can also be rationalized with auditing costs paid by banks to verify project
returns (in the spirit of Townsend (1979)). In our model however returns are veriﬁable, and we have chosen to
sidestep this additional source of adverse selection (i.e. project returns) that would not oﬀer any additional
insights.
6assume that the bond holder has (in period 1) a prior belief about ﬁrm type (b or B). This
is given by a probability equal to  that the ﬁrm is the b-type (high-reliability), and 1   
that is the B-type (low-reliability). Investors of course prefer high reliability borrowers since
they are more likely to manage their projects competently if oﬀered identical compensation
to the low reliability ones. As we shall see the belief about the quality of the ﬁrm can be
updated using ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, loan histories, and market information from ratings
and past issuance.10
This information has been shown by Suﬁ (2007, 2009) to help a ﬁrm gain access to less well
informed investors, and draws on the same reasoning from the same Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997) framework that we use here. In particular, Suﬁ argues that intermediaries and the
loan rating agencies act as informed investors that can send signals to less informed investors,
such as those in the public debt markets. The intermediaries and rating agencies certify that
projects have been successful and conﬁrming the quality of the borrower, through updating
of information on default risk. They also monitor the project by deciding on whether to
invoke covenant requirements, changing or seizing the collateral posted to the project and
so on.













We assume there are two periods as described in Figure 2. In period 1 the ﬁrm owner
seeks ﬁnance from lenders to undertake the project. If the project succeeds, the ﬁrm owner
receives RE and the bond holder (or intermediary) RL, where R(I) = RE + RL. If the
10We refer to this indicator as a ‘rating’ in the remainder of the paper, but we have in mind a that wide
range of information is used to determine its value, including oﬃcial ratings, but also signals from other
sources.
7project fails each receive zero (i.e. we assume limited liability). The project has a positive
net present value (NPV) when the ﬁrm owner manages diligently but negative otherwise:
phR   (1 + ri) > 0 > plR   (1 + rm) + B; i = m;b. For simplicity we can assume the
parameters of the model, ph;pl;B;b;R;I;rb;rm;c are identical across periods.
Solution. Our main objective is to illustrate the role of signals of quality and their
inﬂuence on the likelihood and scale of market ﬁnance. In what follows therefore we focus
on the implications of the model when ﬁrms opt for market ﬁnance. Given our assumptions
on bank ﬁnance, it is easy to show that both types will obtain ﬁnance from banks and the
B-type will never opt for market ﬁnance. Note that the structure of this model is similar
to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), with the addition of a second period. However, we assume
that the outcome (of ﬁnancing and investment) in any given period does not specify anything
(ﬁnancing and investment) for the subsequent period, that is we assume ﬁnance is project
speciﬁc. We can therefore solve the model as a game with period by period maximization
keeping track of the evolution of beliefs from lenders. Essentially the assumptions we make
imply the only link between the two periods is the ﬁrms’ track record (success or failure),
and the associated updating of the rating, . We use backward induction to solve for a
separating equilibrium in which the b-type ﬁrm manages the project diligently while the
B-type ﬁrm does not. The solution of the model determines the optimal investment scale, I,
the division of the project’s return between the borrower, RE, and lender, RL and the level
of net worth, A, that determines the mode of ﬁnance, i.e. market or intermediated ﬁnance.
We present the details of the solution in the Appendix. In the remainder of this section we
state the period 1 maximization problem of the b-type ﬁrm and summarize the main results
that we use below in the empirical sections. The period 2 maximization problem is identical
(except for the rating  which is updated to ′ when the ﬁrm has received market ﬁnance in
period 1).
The ﬁrm’s problem in period 1 is given by U(A) = maxfUm;Ubg where, Ub = phRb
E  
(1 + rb)A and Um = phRm
E   (1 + rb)A denote the net utilities to the ﬁrms’ owner when the
8project receives intermediary and market ﬁnance respectively, subject to:





L = RI for i = m,b





E + bI for i =m,b
Participation constraints for the lender,
market ﬁnance: ph(RI  
bI
∆p
) + (1   )(pl(RI  
bI
∆p
))  (1 + rm)(I + c   A)
intermediary ﬁnance: ph(RI  
bI
∆p
)  (1 + rb)(I   A)
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) show that in equilibrium all the constraints will bind, the
ﬁrm will use its entire net worth into the project and the lenders will ﬁnance the rest, i.e.
I   A, I   (A   c) in the case of intermediary and market respectively. Using the lender’s
participation constraints we can compute the optimal investment level.
Optimal investment scale.
(A   c)m = I (1)
Ab = I (2)





∆p)ph; deﬁne the multipliers on net worth and
 = ph + (1   )pl is the probability of success as perceived by the investor. Equations
(1) and (2) deﬁne the eﬀective technology the ﬁrm has available to implement investment
projects.
9Deﬁnition of net worth threshold. The threshold is computed as the solution, A = A
to the three equations,
Ub = Um; I = bA; I = m(A   c)
In the Appendix we show @A
@ < 0, that is the threshold declines when the rating improves.
2.2 Implications
There are many implications of this illustrative model, such as the likelihood that market
ﬁnance increases in net worth, A. We would expect high collateralized ﬁrms with strong
balance sheets have a higher likelihood of obtaining market ﬁnance compared to those with
weaker balance sheets. Our focus is on the value of a better track record or signal of quality.
The fact that m > 1 means that a ﬁrm can lever its net worth and m can be interpreted
as the multiplier (c.f. Tirole (2006), p.127). Hence for the same value of net worth, ﬁrms
can increase the scale of their investment projects with an improvement in ratings, and
demand more market ﬁnance. Equivalently it implies that ﬁrms can increase their leverage
with a positive updating of their rating (that follows a successful outcome in the previous
period). This is analogous to the argument proposed by Faulkender and Petersen (2006),
who suggest that the volume of lending will increase on the supply-side as perceived quality
of the borrower improves, but also, since the price of debt is lower in markets compared
to loans from intermediaries that incur monitoring costs, the demand for debt may also be
higher. Boot et al. (2006) argue that a good quality signal (in the form of a rating) could
prove to be an ‘information equalizer’, enlarging the investor base and expanding the ability
to borrow. In addition, through the eﬀect on A, less well collateralized ﬁrms can access a
greater volume of market ﬁnance. This eﬀect is discussed by Cantor and Packer (1996) and
Boot et al. (2006) when they identify the role of ratings as a minimum quality standard
that allows certain types of investors to purchase securities. The cutoﬀ between investment
grade and sub-investment grade ratings is particularly important for pension funds, savings
10and loans institutions and money market mutual funds, for example. The combined eﬀect
implies that the likelihood of obtaining market ﬁnance increases with the perceived signal of
quality from a successful track record in loan, private and public bond markets.
Although the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) framework is essentially static, it illustrates
the point that ﬁrms have an incentive to invest in a track record (in period 1) in order to
obtain (greater) access to ﬁnance (in period 2). There is a growing body of evidence that
suggests signals of quality of various kinds beneﬁt the ﬁrm that seeks market ﬁnance.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
Suﬁ (2007) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006) have shown that more transparent ﬁrms,
with publicly-available audited accounts and third-party certiﬁcation of quality from a rating
agency, are able to access uniformed investors more easily than ﬁrms that are more opaque.
Similarly, Suﬁ (2009) has shown that obtaining a loan rating helps a ﬁrm gain access to
less well informed investors, and as a result increase their debt usage and investment. In
a somewhat similar exercise to our own, Suﬁ (2009) investigates ﬁrms that previously had
no signal of quality in the form of an issuer default rating prior to the emergence of loan
ratings, positing that these ﬁrms could beneﬁt from a loan rating in the absence of any signal
of quality from an issuer default rating. His identiﬁcation scheme exploits the emergence
of loan ratings provides the third-party certiﬁcation that certain ﬁrms lacked before loan
ratings were made available by Moody’s and S&P in 1995. Other covariates in the model
control for ﬁrm characteristics such as age, size, earnings, market-to-book and debt levels
that might account for borrower quality and demand eﬀects. His empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm
that previously unrated ﬁrms have greater gains from loan ratings and experience an increase
in the change in debt level and leverage ratios, and ﬁrms with lower credit quality have the
greatest gains.11
11A related paper by Hale and Santos (2008) addresses the timing of the ﬁrm’s decision to issue a debt
IPO. They argue that the ﬁrms’ creditworthiness and standing in ﬁnancial markets inﬂuences the decision
and timing to issue public bonds. Their paper uses leverage, proﬁtability, and the Z-score to assess cred-
11In a branch of the literature that discusses the choice between markets and securities
of diﬀerent types, Gomes and Phillips (2012) show that asymmetric information is a major
determinant of securities issuance. Debt is preferred over equity in public markets as in-
formation asymmetry increases, while equity and covertibles are preferred over debt in the
private markets under the same circumstances. They also discuss the types of securities
chosen by public and private ﬁrms, showing public ﬁrms tend to increase private issues when
information asymmetry increases. Finally, they examine the behavior of ﬁrms that issue
multiple times, ﬁnding that the eﬀects of asymmetric information are compounded for these
ﬁrms i.e. ﬁrms are even more likely to issue particular securities within markets if they
are multiple issuers. Erel et al. (2012) investigates the eﬀects of macroeconomic conditions
on the volume and type of securities issued. Firms of diﬀerent credit quality are shown to
issue diﬀerent type of securities (e.g. equity, loans, convertible, private and public bonds)
and that low quality ﬁrms are shut out of capital markets during downturns. Importantly,
high quality borrowers are shown to issue public bonds countercyclically, highlighting the
importance of a high bond rating for continuous access to the market.
Diamond (1991), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Yasuda (2005), Schenone (2004), Hale and
Santos (2008) demonstrate the importance of lending relationships on the timing and pricing
of bond IPOs, equity prices, or underwriting fees, which suggests previous access to loans
contributes to initial access to the public bond market. Survival of multiple rounds of bank
loans with successful outcomes establishes creditworthiness of the borrower. Altman et al.
(2010) argue that banks, as insiders, have superior information due to privileged information
they can access in contrast to the public information available to public debt holders. Bank
loan renewal is considered a positive signal about the borrower’s quality, to which the market
reacts favorably in terms of increased equity prices (see Lummer and McConnel (1989)).
Similarly, access to private bond markets may signal ﬁrms as potential future issuers
of pubic bonds. Hale and Santos (2008) ﬁnd that issuing under private bonds delays the
itworthiness, which we might refer to as balance-sheet measures. The track record in loan markets is then
determined from evidence that the ﬁrm has successfully obtained multiple loans using the same underwriter.
12timing of a ﬁrm’s bond IPO although they argue that private and public bonds are not
close substitutes for regulatory reasons. Erel et al. (2012) and Hertzel and Smith (1993),
both argue that lower quality ﬁrms rely on private placements (especially during downturns)
instead of public oﬀerings. Kwan and Carleton (2010) show that private placement bonds
are more likely to have greater restrictions in terms of covenants compared to public bonds.
Private placement bonds tend be issued by smaller and riskier ﬁrms, and they ﬁnd that less
than investment-grade borrowers rarely issued bonds in the public market. In this case we
expect a negative coeﬃcient.
In the following sections we consider ﬁrms that have varying degrees of third-party cer-
tiﬁcation in the form of a past history of repeated, successful loans under the same lead
arranger, a history of private bond placements, and ﬁnally reliable public bond issuance
inferred from the market-implied bond rating and the previous issuance history. We also
control for borrower quality and demand eﬀects, before we explore the impact of diﬀerent
third-party indicators of creditor quality. Empirically, we are able to show that at each level
the additional information enhances the perception of quality and increases the probability
of issuance after controlling for other factors. This suggests that the ﬁnancial track record
has value for the ﬁrm, presenting a challenge for theorists to build dynamic models in which
ﬁrms have an incentive to invest in signals of quality that improve access to ﬁnancial markets.
3 Data, methodology and sample characteristics
3.1 Data set
We construct our dataset using several data sources. These have been combined in a new
way to cast light on the impact of track record reputation from implied bond ratings on
the ﬁrm’s probability to access the bond market. We ﬁrst use the Datastream database
to gather proﬁt and loss and balance sheet data. This database provides information on
US listed companies for the period 1995-2004. The analysis includes both ﬁrms that issued
13domestic corporate US dollar denominated bonds with Datastream coverage, and ﬁrms that
are non-issuers. Datastream is used to identify bond issuers and bond characteristics.12
Following selection criteria which are common in the literature, we excluded companies that
did not have complete records on our explanatory variables, and ﬁrm-years with negative
sales. To control for the potential inﬂuence of outliers, we excluded observations in the 0.5
percent from upper and lower tails of the distribution of the regression variables.
Data on ﬁrm (issuer) ratings are taken from the Standard & Poor’s CreditPro database.
This database provides information on the long-term issuer default rating assigned to each
ﬁrm as well as the date that the rating became available. Thus we record the continuous
rating history on each ﬁrm. Our sample spans 10 years, from 1995 to 2004 and the entire
ratings spectrum, including investment grade and speculative grade ﬁrms. In keeping with
the normal practice in the literature, we categorize our ﬁrms into rating categories without
consideration of notches (i.e + or -).
To compute market implied bond ratings we have used two sources. First, data on
corporate and government bond yields come from Datastream. Second, the S&P corporate
bond yield index is taken from Bloomberg for various combinations of credit ratings and
maturities. The ﬁrm speciﬁc bond ratings we compute span 6 categories (AAA, AA, A,
BBB, BB, B), again without considering notches. We are particularly interested in point in
time ratings from the bond market, which rules out the use of market implied ratings from
equity or CDS markets, that refer to the quality of the ﬁrm rather than the bond that it
issues.
We rely on Thomson Financial One Banker to collect information on ﬁrms’ bank relation-
ships. This database reports data on ﬁrms’ lead bank managers who acted as underwriters
in the closed loan deals as well on the description of the loan yield. We are therefore able to
observe whether a particular underwriter has been engaged with the same ﬁrm more than
12 Datastream uses Merrill Lynch as a data source for bond information. See Chen et al. (2007) for a
description of the Datastream database with bond coverage. In our sample bond issuers issue bonds most
of which are actively traded in the secondary market.
14once and in addition we are able to see whether the loan yield was classiﬁed as investment
grade or sub-investment grade.
Our combined sample contains data for 983 ﬁrms that actively operated between 1995
and 2004 in a variety of sectors such as manufacturing, utilities, resources, services and
ﬁnancials.13 The panel has an unbalanced structure with the number of observations on
each ﬁrm varying between three and ten.
3.2 Methodology
We model the probability of a ﬁrm deciding to issue corporate bonds and following Pagano
et al. (1998), Datta et al. (2000) we consider a probit model of bond issuance as a function
of a vector of determinants.14 We use similar variables to those in the literature to allow
for the eﬀects of information asymmetries through ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (Faulkender and
Petersen (2006), Erel et al. (2012), Gomes and Phillips (2012)), ﬁrm issuer default ratings
(c.f. Cantor and Packer (1996), Boot et al. (2006), and Suﬁ (2007, 2009)), the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
history in loan and private bond markets (c.f. Suﬁ (2007), Hale and Santos (2008)), and
market implied bond ratings to capture the quality signals from the bond market.
3.2.1 Indicators of ﬁrm size and creditworthiness
The decision of a ﬁrm to access bond markets is driven in part by the demand for the funds
for investment purposes, and by the willingness of investors to hold the debt of the issuer.
Thus the fundamental decision to issue is determined by ﬁrm characteristics such as its size,
growth of business, its existing debt and credit quality. Here we rehearse the arguments for
13 Our sample includes both non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial ﬁrms to ensure comparability with previous studies
(e.g Datta et al. (2000)). However, non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms dominate in our dataset; for example, only 20.8 percent
of the observations in our sample correspond to ﬁnancials, insurance, investment and real estate ﬁrms. We
later test our model excluding ﬁnancial ﬁrms and ﬁnd our results are robust to this exclusion.
14Using a similar methodology Erel et al. (2012) and Gomes and Phillips (2012) focus instead on the choice
ﬁrms make over multiple securities.
15including these variables, before we consider the additional inﬂuence that a track record may
have on that decision.
Public debt has been found to be positively related to size, which we measure as the
logarithm of real total assets (SIZE). The likelihood of access to bond markets increases
in size, since leverage opportunities improve, and as size increases ﬁrms are more likely to
need the level of resources that markets can oﬀer at lower cost (see Graham et al. (1998)
and Faulkender and Petersen (2006)). In addition SIZE may also control for the fact that
smaller ﬁrms ﬁnd public debt too costly given underwriting, ﬁling, legal and bond rating
fees, for these reasons Faulkender and Petersen (2006) argue that this is a critical variable
for access to public debt markets.
Our model also suggests that balance sheet variables will be informative about the ﬁrm’s
creditworthiness, and previous literature has typically controlled for these eﬀects before
assessing other signals of quality.15 Here we use many of the same variables to measure
creditworthiness of the ﬁrm including leverage, proﬁtability, interest coverage and capital
expenditure, and in robustness checks we include other variables such as a Z-score based risk
measure, age, collateral assets and an indicator of growth opportunities. Leverage (LEV),
deﬁned as total debt over total assets, is used as a measure of ﬁrms’ indebtedness, in previous
empirical work by Pagano et al. (1998), Datta et al. (2000), and Dennis and Mihov (2003).
They suggest that the opportunity to access the public bond market should improve for
ﬁrms with high leverage since these ﬁrms are successful and have higher borrowing capacity
which is realized in the form of higher debt to assets ratios. In this case one would expect
a positive relationship between leverage and the probability to issue bonds. Faulkender and
Petersen (2006) and Santos and Winton (2008) ﬁnd that leverage increases with access to
public bond markets, which they argue reﬂects the relaxation of credit constraints for ﬁrms
15Hale and Santos (2008) evaluate the impact of proﬁtability, leverage, risk based on a broadly deﬁned Z-
score and growth opportunities on the hazard rate for bond issuance. Santos and Winton (2008) evaluate the
beneﬁts of bond market access on the loan spreads faced by ﬁrms after controlling for ﬁrm creditworthiness
measured by age, proﬁtability, interest coverage, leverage, Z-score, collateral assets in total assets, growth
opportunities and other indicators of the need for ﬁnance based on the extent of working capital available
and levels of expenditure to sales.
16with a market ﬁnance opportunity.
We take the proﬁtability ratio (PROF), deﬁned as earnings before interest and taxes to
total assets, as a measure of revenue generation after costs, as an indicator of the availability
of internal funds. A healthier net earnings position adds to net wealth which enhances the
ability of the ﬁrm to obtain arm’s length ﬁnance, lowering the threshold for market access
and improving leverage Faulkender and Petersen (2006). Dennis and Mihov (2003) and
Santos and Winton (2008) argue that more proﬁtable ﬁrms prefer to issue public debt rather
than access further bank ﬁnance. We expect therefore the probability to access the bond
market to increase for ﬁrms with greater ability to generate revenue.
The coverage ratio (COV), measured as earnings before interest and taxes over interest
payments, has been used in earlier studies (Dennis and Mihov (2003) and Santos and Winton
(2008)), as a measure of creditworthiness since it indicates the ability of the ﬁrm to service
its existing debt. We might expect that a higher coverage ratio gives a positive signal of
a healthy balance sheet, but, as we have discussed, successful ﬁrms are sometimes more
indebted (more highly levered) than less successful ones, and since interest payments grow
with the level of debt and with the interest rate, we may ﬁnd a lower coverage ratio for
successful ﬁrms (Berens and Cuny (1995), Andrade and Kaplan (1997) and Faulkender and
Petersen (2006)).
We include a measure of current investment (CAPEX), deﬁned as capital expenditure
over total asset, to proxy for the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing needs following (Pagano et al. (1998);
Gomes and Phillips (2012) and Datta et al. (2000)). Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and
Santos and Winton (2008) included a more focused measure of spending using the ratio
R&D expenditure to sales. Our model suggests that as ﬁrms require more funds they may
be forced to seek ﬁnance from the markets, we therefore expect ﬁrms with greater ﬁnancing
needs will have a higher probability to issue bonds.
In addition to these ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables on the creditworthiness of the potential issuer,
we also measure the extent of the external ﬁnance obtained from sources other than the bond
17market. The bank ﬁnance variable (BANKFIN), deﬁned as short-term debt to total assets,
indicates the amount of bank loan ﬁnance obtained by the ﬁrm and the equity ﬁnance variable
(EQFIN), deﬁned as shareholders’ equities over total assets, measures the outstanding equity
of the ﬁrm relative to its assets. As we will explain in the next sub-section, we control for the
eﬀect of access to successive bank loans so we anticipate that the access to bank ﬁnance and
equity ﬁnance measures used here will indicate the demand-side inﬂuences on the probability
of issuance in the bond market. If the ﬁrm can obtain suﬃcient ﬁnance from bank loans
or equity issues it may not seek additional funding in the bond market, the eﬀects are then
expected to be negative on the probability of issue. But if bank funding and equity ﬁnance
are used in combination with bond ﬁnance then the eﬀects are expected to be positive on
the probability of issue. This is ultimately an empirical matter.
Having controlled for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables that inﬂuence demand for debt, the variables
in the remaining two sub-sections are unlikely to proxy for demand factors, and instead
measure the inﬂuence of quality signals on supply.
3.2.2 Controls for access to private bonds and loans
Previous literature such as Diamond (1991), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Yasuda (2005),
Schenone (2004), Hale and Santos (2008) has argued for and demonstrated the importance of
lending relationships on the timing and pricing of bond IPOs, equity prices, or underwriting
fees. We therefore expect that previous successful lending relationships to assist the ﬁrm in
accessing the public bond market. Suﬁ (2007, 2009) has shown that third-party certiﬁcation
of quality is an important signal to uniformed investors, that improves access to ﬁnancial
markets. In particular, the degrees of information available to uninformed investors has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the willingness of those investors to purchase the debt. We use two
alternative measures to control for this eﬀect.
First, we consider previous private bond placements issued under SEC Rule 144A (RULE144A).16
16Rule144A issues can be traded without restrictions in the secondary market among ‘qualiﬁed institutional
buyers’. Rule144A oﬀers several advantages to issuing ﬁrms such as limited information disclosure at the time
18RULE 144A is a dummy equal to one if the bond has been issued in the private market under
the 144A rule which we expect to provide an information beneﬁt to the ﬁrst time issuer from
the private bond market and hence increase the probability of a public issue. We might
expect that some ﬁrms access the private bond markets in order to advertise themselves and
make the pubic bond issuance more viable. For example Hale and Santos (2008) ﬁnd that
issuing under this rule delays the timing of a ﬁrm’s bond IPO. Hence these placements may
help to establish some recognition before entering the public market for the ﬁrst time by
enhancing visibility in the private market. However, among ﬁrms that issue bonds included
in this particular sample, private bond issuance may have a negative eﬀect on the probability
of issuing public bonds. Private bonds are not as marketable as public bonds, and a ﬁrms
would not choose this option over public bond issuance unless there was a reason that public
bond issuance was unattainable at reasonable cost. Consistent with this interpretation Erel
et al. (2012) and Hertzel and Smith (1993), both argue that lower quality ﬁrms rely on pri-
vate placements (especially during downturns) instead of public oﬀerings. If the two types
of bonds are substitutes, a ﬁrm issuing private bonds would be unlikely to also issue public
bonds, and vice versa. But Hale and Santos (2008) argue that private and public bonds are
not close substitutes for regulatory reasons based on SEC determined conditions for trading.
If they are not substitutes and private bond issues are regarded as an inferior form of issue,
private bonds send a signal of weakness among other issuers. Using non-Rule 144A infor-
mation about private placements issued before the SEC adopted rule 144A in 1990, Kwan
and Carleton (2010) show that private placement bonds are more likely to have greater re-
of issuance and expedited issuance. Rule 144A issues represent a substantial portion of private placements
(Dennis and Mihov (2003)). Some authors suggest that bonds issued under Rule 144A are more similar
to public bonds, while private placement bonds are diﬀerent (see Gomes and Phillips (2012)). According
to their data, smaller ﬁrms issue a small proportion of Rule 144A bonds compared to medium and larger
ﬁrms in the second, third and fourth quartiles of the distribution. However, Hale and Santos (2008) argue
that Rule144A bonds and public bonds are not similar for regulatory reasons based on SEC determined
conditions for trading. If this is the case, they may be regarded as an inferior form of issue by the markets,
which would provide some signal of track record but not as favorable as a public issue if both options were
available to the ﬁrm. For our purposes, where Rule144A bonds appear on the spectrum of private and public
bond issues is not as important as the fact that they potentially oﬀer some signal of quality for ﬁrms that
previously never issued bonds.
19strictions in terms of covenants compared to public bonds. Private placement bonds tend be
issued by smaller and riskier ﬁrms, and they ﬁnd that less than investment-grade borrowers
rarely issued bonds in the public market. In this case we expect a negative coeﬃcient.
Second, we consider the loan market. It is well documented in the literature that survival
of multiple rounds of bank loans with successful outcomes establishes creditworthiness of the
borrower. Altman et al. (2010) argue that banks, as insiders, have superior information due
to privileged information they can access in contrast to the public information available to
public debt holders. Bank loan renewal is regarded as a positive signal of the borrower’s
quality, to which the market reacts favorably in terms of increased equity prices (see Lummer
and McConnel (1989)). Given that banks actively monitor loans, and are generally more
informative about the borrowers, it should allow a multiple borrower to more readily enter
the public market than a ﬁrm without a track record of loans. Certainly, evidence from the
syndicated loan market reported by Suﬁ (2009) suggests that ﬁrms that have repeat access to
the market have more success in obtaining wider investor participation. Therefore to control
for bank loans we create two dummy variables. First, we construct a dummy (RELATION-
SHIP) which takes the value of one if the ﬁrm has used the same lead bank manager in
their loan deals more than one time and zero otherwise. Having repeated relationships with
the same loan underwriter enhances perceived quality in the loan market.17 In addition, we
create a dummy which takes the value one if the ﬁrm’s loan yields are always classiﬁed as
investment grade (LOAN YIELD) and zero otherwise.
3.2.3 Quantifying the importance of market implied bond ratings
Our main objective in this study is to establish the importance of track record in the bond
market on a ﬁrm’s decisions to issue bonds. To argue that previous issuing history explains
the decision to issue in the present is not simply to push the question back to a previous year.
We have already argued that demand and supply considerations, driven to a large extent
17A related concept used by Hale and Santos (2008) identify bank “reputation” when the ﬁrm has used
the same lead bank in the syndicate loan in the previous year.
20by a ﬁrm’s characteristics, determine the willingness to seek bond ﬁnance on the demand
side and the access to ﬁnance on the supply side. Fundamentally these variables determine
whether a ﬁrm can issue, but track record in the market can contribute to the assurance
that investors seek, therefore, we include indications of previous participation in the market
and the quality of the bonds indicated by spread-implied ratings.
To assign ratings for individual bonds we calculate spread-implied ratings from corporate
bond yields using the procedure developed by Servigny and Sandow (2007). The necessary
ingredients for this procedure are: (i) corporate bond spreads and (ii) a market spread for
each diﬀerent maturity and rating in order to map corporate bond spreads onto market
spreads and infer the appropriate market implied bond rating.
To compute corporate bond spreads we take the diﬀerence between yield to maturity for
corporate and government bond, i.e. SPREAD = Y TM
corp
t;T   Y TM
gov
t;T , where Y TM
corp
t;T
represents the yield to maturity at time t of a corporate bond that matures at time T and
Y TM
gov
t;T the yield to maturity of a government bond with the same maturity. To compute
market spreads for each maturity and rating we rely on an index which provides a summary
yield for bonds in each rating category taken from S&P. Using this index we construct a
family of market spreads by maturity and rating. Having this family of market spreads we
can then assign a market implied rating for each corporate bond. We then employ a simple
distance measure to identify the market spread curve that is closest to the ﬁrm speciﬁc
spread and the rating that corresponds to this closest spread curve is the market implied
bond rating.18 The ratings we compute span 6 categories (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B). Once
we have created implied ratings for all corporate bonds, we construct transition matrices of
18Speciﬁcally, deﬁne y(j;i) as the market spread for maturity j and rating i, and s(j) the ﬁrm speciﬁc
spread for maturity j. In this notation, i =1...M denotes ratings and j =1...N denotes maturities. In
order to compute an implied bond rating for each ﬁrm at each point in time from the market spread curves
we ﬁnd the curve that is closest to the ﬁrm speciﬁc spreads with the distance measured in terms of the sum
of square diﬀerences at the various observed maturities. Thus, the implied rating is given by:




21implied ratings for each ﬁrm.
We deﬁne as “steady issuers” those ﬁrms whose bonds’ implied ratings with at least two
years of issuance that have not been downgraded at any time in the sample. Suﬁ (2007)
shows that previous access to the syndicated loan market is an important marker for future
access to the market. The argument is based on the advantage a ﬁrm obtains from being
“known” by potential participants in the syndicated loan; a similar argument is used by
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) for access to debt markets more generally.19 Other ﬁrms
that do not have this characteristic will have been downgraded at least one time during the
sample period. A “fallen angel” with a recently downgraded credit rating will therefore be
identiﬁed through this indicator, which will allow us to account for the fact that they face
a higher hurdle in the market when considering the prospect of issuing bonds than a ﬁrm
with a steady or improving credit rating. Therefore, we deﬁne STEADY RECORDit as a
dummy variable that takes the value one for ﬁrms that have previously issued bonds and
have not been downgraded, and zero otherwise. These have a reliably constant track record
in previous issues, that increases the likelihood that the ﬁrms will issue bonds compared to
a ﬁrm without this beneﬁt.
A potential weakness of this measure is that it is not necessarily an indicator of a good
quality issuer. A ﬁrm with a sub-investment grade market implied bond rating that is not
downgraded will have a steady track record, while an investment grade issuer that has been
downgraded to a lower investment grade rating will not. To address this concern we redeﬁne
our measure to require the ﬁrm (i) to have never been downgraded during the sample period
and (ii) to have an investment grade bond rating. We deﬁne this as GOOD RECORDit:
This reﬁnement is quite important as demonstrated in recent work by Erel et al. (2012)
and Kahle and Stulz (2010) who ﬁnd issuers with an investment grade rating are (a) more
likely to issue public bonds (and do so very strongly during downturns) and (b) have been
19Boot et al. (2006) note that evidence in Weinstein (1977), Ederington and Yawitz (1987), Cornell et al.
(1989), Hand et al. (1992), Goh and Ederington (1993), and Dichev and Piotroski (2002) shows there is a
signiﬁcant, detectable inﬂuence of a bond market downgrade on the stock price of the ﬁrm, but no evidence
of an upgrade on the stock price.
22relatively unaﬀected from the credit crunch during the recent ﬁnancial crisis compared to
non-investment grade borrowers.
A further concern with the use of these deﬁnitions for all ﬁrms— including both issuers
and non-issuers—is that ﬁrms that have never issued bonds are included in the category of
ﬁrms with no track record. While it is true that these ﬁrms cannot acquire a record without
issuing bonds in the market, we may want to ensure that we consider new issuers or low
grade issuers against those that are seasoned and high grade. For this reason we exclude
non-issuers from our sample. The remaining ﬁrms issue at some point in the sample, but
not all ﬁrms issue in every period, so there is still a binary decision about issuing bonds in
any period. This reduces the sample size but gives us a clean test of the value of repeated
issuance and maintenance of a strong quality signal among issuers.
3.3 Summary statistics
A summary of the basic statistics of the variables included in our empirical analysis as well
as additional ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables is provided in Table 1. When describing the data, we are
interested in two comparisons, ﬁrst, between those ﬁrms with access to bond markets versus
those with no bonds (issuers and non-issuers in columns 2 and 3), and second, between ﬁrms
with a good track record in the market and those without (“good record” and “poor record”
in columns 5 and 6).
There are notable diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial variables between issuers and non-issuers
as can be seen from the p-values of the diﬀerences in the means between categories. We ﬁnd
that ﬁrms with access to bond markets are larger, older, more proﬁtable, are more highly
leveraged, have greater ﬁnancing needs, are more collateralized and have lower coverage
ratios than ﬁrms that are non-issuers. The characteristics of issuers in our sample are in
line with those reported in Erel et al. (2012) who examine the impact of macroeconomic
conditions on the volume and choice of assets issued. Notice that we include both a long
term ﬁrm speciﬁc rating and a bond implied rating in Table 1. We can observe that issuers
23have a better ﬁrm speciﬁc rating compared to non-issuers, where a higher value is associated
with a lower rating and the same is true for steady quality issuers. It remains to be seen,
though, whether these ﬁndings continue to hold when we control for a number of factors
which are expected to play a role in the ﬁrm’s decision to issue bonds. In the sections that
follow we formally test whether market implied bond ratings have a statistically signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s decision to issue bonds.
4 Results
4.1 The baseline model
We begin with the baseline speciﬁcation that allows the balance sheet characteristics of the
ﬁrm and information from loans and private bond markets:
Pr(BONDit = 1) = F(a0 + a1LEVi(t−1) + a2PROFi(t−1) + a3COVi(t−1)
+ a4CAPEXi(t−1) + a5SIZEi(t−1) + a6BANKFIN + a7EQFIN + a8RULE144Ait
+ a9(RELATIONSHIPit or LOANY IELDit) + uj + ut) (3)
where BOND is a dummy variable that equals 1 if ﬁrm i issued a bond in year t, and 0
otherwise. Our speciﬁcation includes regressors evaluated at time t   1, a full set of time
dummies, ut; intended to capture common trends and business cycle eﬀects 20 ; and uj, a full
set of industry dummies to control for ﬁxed eﬀects across industries.21 All other variables
have been deﬁned in the previous section.
Table 2 reports estimates from the baseline model reporting the eﬀects of balance sheet
20In an earlier version we have also included the slope of the Treasury yield curve as deﬁned by the
diﬀerence between 30-year and 5-year Treasury bonds to control the eﬀect of future expectations about
future rates on ﬁrms’ decision to issue bonds. The results reported in remainder of the paper, which are not
reported for brevity, were broadly similar.
21 We corroborate our ﬁndings using regressors at time t. The empirical results are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar. These results are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request.
24variables, private rule 144 bond issues and from loan markets in two diﬀerent columns.22 The
results also control for the demand side since we measure bank and equity ﬁnance obtained
by the ﬁrm. We use a sample of ﬁrms that are all issuers at some point in the sample, we
exclude those ﬁrms that are non-issuers. 23
The dominating ﬁrm characteristic is SIZE. This has a positive eﬀect on the probability
of issue, and for each percentage point increase in size, the probability of issue increases by
approximately 0.11. The theoretical model makes the proposition that real assets will be a
critical factor in determining access to bond markets and this is what we ﬁnd.
Other ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics are also signiﬁcant, such as the capital expenditure
ratio (CAPEX), which provides a useful indicator of current investment. As in Datta et al.
(2000) and Santos and Winton (2008) where capital expenditure is taken as a proxy for
ﬁnancing needs, we expect a greater probability of bond issuance for ﬁrms that have high
capital expenditures. We ﬁnd that this is the case. Similarly, proﬁtability raises the prob-
ability of issuing. The coverage ratio (COV) has a negative eﬀect on issuance, but this
is consistent with the view that successful ﬁrms often hold more debt and this raises their
interest payments, lowering the coverage ratio.24 A number of studies report a similar result
including Hale and Santos (2008) and Santos and Winton (2008). Leverage (LEV) has a
small positive eﬀect on the probability of issue. This result is line with Hale and Santos
(2008) who found that ﬁrms with higher levels of leverage enter the public bond market
earlier as well as with Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Santos and Winton (2008) who
found that leverage increases with access to public bond markets.
The BANKFIN and the EQFIN variables have small negative eﬀects on the probability
of issue. If either source of funds is an alternative in the external ﬁnance mix of the ﬁrm
22The model reported here has been selected from a number of alternative speciﬁcations that we do not
report due to space constraints.
23We did examine all our results for the full sample including all issuers, and the results are qualitatively
very similar. Among the ﬁrm characteristics, all the variables have a comparable inﬂuence on the probability
to issue bonds, and the impact of signals from the private bond market and the loan market is stronger.
These results are available from the authors on request.
24Additional debt for successful ﬁrms is also consistent with the relaxation of credit constraints as argued
by Faulkender and Petersen (2006)).
25to bond ﬁnance then we expect a negative sign. This is a demand side eﬀect resulting from
access to bank and equity ﬁnance. Bank ﬁnance has a small but signiﬁcant negative marginal
eﬀect on bond issuance, while equity has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect, diminishing the probability
of a bond issue for ﬁrms in our sample. In the remaining tables of results we drop the EQFIN
variable but retain BANKFIN.
Observing ﬁrms that comply with the Rule 144A shows that ﬁrms with these private
bond oﬀerings had a lower probability of issuing public bonds, the marginal eﬀect was -
0.12. Issuing private 144 bonds is an inferior option to oﬀering public bonds if this option is
available at reasonable cost, therefore this is a negative signal for ﬁrms that are all issuers.
The negative eﬀect of this signal is substantial, equal in its marginal eﬀect to a percentage
point increase in size.
When we consider the loan market our econometric speciﬁcation controls for two dimen-
sions reported in two diﬀerent columns. In the ﬁrst column of results we add a dummy
which captures the ﬁrm’s relationships with lead bank managers in underwriting bank loans
(RELATIONSHIP): if a ﬁrm uses the same underwriter more than once it is expected to
have a positive eﬀect. We ﬁnd it is more likely to issue bonds since the coeﬃcient is highly
signiﬁcant, with a marginal eﬀect that raises the probability of issue by 0.10. The role of
multiple previous relationships with a lead bank manager corresponds closely with the mul-
tiple loan arrangements found to improve the investor participation in loan syndicates by
Suﬁ (2007). In the second column of results we add a dummy which captures the history
of loan yields (LOAN YIELD). Given that we control for the eﬀects of bank loans as a
substitute or complement to bond ﬁnance through the use of the BANKFIN variable we
consider these variables to be a pure measure of the quality of the borrower. We observe
that ﬁrms with loan yields that are always classiﬁed as investment grade will have greater
access to the bond market, since the coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant, and the marginal eﬀect
is 0.16. This is an example of third-party certiﬁcation in the loan market that enhances
access to debt ﬁnance; while Suﬁ (2007) ﬁnds that this signal improves further access to the
26syndicated loan market, we ﬁnd it is also important in promoting access to the bond market.
Both controls conﬁrm the result from the loan market previously documented by Hale and
Santos (2008). Both private bond placements and previous bank relationships or history of
loan yields are extremely important factors and have a positive inﬂuence on the decision of
ﬁrms to go public. In the next section we take up the main question in the paper. What is
the role of signals from market implied bond ratings after controlling for these eﬀects?
4.2 The eﬀect of track record on bond issuance
In this section we assess whether track record in the bond market itself inﬂuences a ﬁrm’s
decision to issue controlling for variables shown to be important in the previous section. Our
theoretical model predicts that the probability of obtaining market ﬁnance increases with a
better signal of quality acquired in the bond market. To test this implication, we augment
the baseline speciﬁcation with a measure of the direct indicators of quality from the market
implied bond ratings, and the issuance history of the ﬁrm. The speciﬁcation is:
Pr(BONDit = 1) = F(a0 + a1LEVi(t−1) + a2PROFi(t−1) + a3COVi(t−1) + a4CAPEXi(t−1)
+ a5SIZEi(t−1) + a6BANKFIN + a7(STEADY RECORDit or GOOD RECORDit)
+ a8RULE144Ait + a9(RELATIONSHIPit or LOANY IELDit) + uj + ut) (4)
We report estimation results in Table 3. The impact of the variables discussed in the pre-
vious section is very similar in magnitude and level of signiﬁcance and in the interest of space
we do not discuss them here. We ﬁnd a large positive coeﬃcient on STEADY RECORD
that is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The marginal eﬀect of track record suggests
that changing the status of the ﬁrm from an issuer without signals to a “reliably constant
quality” issuer would increase the probability of bond ﬁnance by 0.19, after allowing for all
27the eﬀects discussed in Table 2. This is an important result, considering the arm’s length
nature of bond ﬁnance and the prevalence of uninformed investors. One would expect that
the marginal impact of this variable after the ﬁrst bond IPO would not be as important for
subsequent issues, but track record in the bond market counts. This veriﬁes that the ‘known
quantity’ eﬀect identiﬁed by Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Suﬁ (2007) is also an im-
portant factor in the bond market. This result shows that the market implied bond rating
is very inﬂuential in determining the probability of bond issuance even after we control for
other variables in our empirical speciﬁcations.
Given the large role for the market implied bond rating, we investigate the robust-
ness of our results by replacing our STEADY RECORD variable with the alternative
GOOD RECORD for investment grade ﬁrms only, in Table 4. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with
an investment grade implied rating that has been maintained have a higher probability of
issuing bonds around 0.20, a very similar magnitude to the eﬀect estimated in Table 3.
Once a ﬁrm has acquired this record from repeated high-grade issues in the market it has
a strong incentive to continue to issue and maintain this signal. Its own history in the market
makes it an issuer known for high quality by investors in the public bond market. In fact,
recent work by Erel et al. (2012), using a similar methodology, suggests that, in addition to
ﬁrm level characteristics, maintaining an investment grade bond rating is very important in
accessing the market during downturns.25 It is important to note that the signiﬁcance of
track record for bond issuance are robust to including a number of additional right hand side
variables previously found (see e.g. Hale and Santos (2008) and Santos and Winton (2008))
to be important determinants of bond market access.26
25It is interesting to note that when we include an NBER recession dummy, we ﬁnd, consistent with the
evidence in Erel et al. (2012) that in recessions, steady quality issuers are three times more likely to issue
bonds compared to ﬁrms who lack this quality signal.
26Speciﬁcally, these variables are the Z-SCORE intended to capture ﬁrm speciﬁc risk , ﬁrms’ growth
opportunities, age and collateral assets. We do not report these results here for brevity but are available
upon request.
284.2.1 Excluding ﬁnancial ﬁrms
Excluding ﬁnancial ﬁrms reduces our ﬁrm-year observations to 3482 but it makes virtually
no diﬀerence to the results. Table 5 provides the estimated coeﬃcients with their signiﬁcance
and marginal eﬀects, and these diﬀer hardly at all compared to results reported in Table
3. The impact of indicators from the balance sheet, loan market, private bond market and
previous public issues have the same impact on the probability of issuing for non-ﬁnancials
as they do for the whole sample. We conclude that our results are not driven by the unique
behavior of ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
4.2.2 Allowing for ﬁrm speciﬁc ratings
It is possible that the measure of quality in the bond market based on a market implied
bond rating for the bonds being issued is in fact proxying for the default risk of the entire
ﬁrm. To address this issue we include in the reported results in Table 8 the ﬁndings of our
model when we include the lagged Standard and Poor’s long term default rating for the ﬁrm
in our regression equation (S&PRATING-LAGGED).27 We ﬁnd that the lagged rating is
signiﬁcant and has a marginal eﬀect that reduces the probability of issuance by 0.03. It does
not alter the marginal impact of other variables that remain signiﬁcant and preserve their
rank order of importance. The negative sign may suggest that, as the ﬁrm’s issuer default
rating in general improves, the ﬁrm substitutes away at the margin from public bond ﬁnance
to other forms of ﬁnance such as equity ﬁnance.
In addition to these robustness checks we allow for the potential endogeneity of regressors
and for the choice of alternative sample periods, and none of these changes alters our results.28
27As an alternative test we have included a set of dummy variables, one for each rating category. Our
results, not reported for brevity, were broadly unchanged.
28The ﬁndings are available on request.
295 Conclusion
More corporate bonds have been issued in the last decade than in any other, and the market
has more than tripled in the volume of bonds outstanding, but it long been known that
not all ﬁrms are in a position to take advantage of these unusual conditions. Firms are
heterogeneous and have diﬀering degrees of ﬁnancial status which inﬂuences their ability
to access external markets for debt. We are not primarily interested in the choice between
securities of diﬀerent types, but rather on the eﬀect of signals of quality on the probability of
access to public bond markets. Data from our study, and the recent work of Erel et al. (2012),
shows that issuers of public bonds are typically older, more proﬁtable, more collateralized,
and they have better ratings from the credit rating agencies. Their age allows them to have
built relationships with banks over time, which gives them a further advantage over ﬁrms
with poorer histories, or no histories, on which to base an assessment of their quality. The
quality of the borrower is a critical matter, since there is a very marked distinction in access
to bond markets between investment grade and non-investment grade issuers, especially
during downturns (Erel et al. (2012)).
The recent literature on public bond issuance has sought to measure the gains from a
good track record in loan markets. For example, Suﬁ (2007, 2009) shows that third-party
certiﬁcation of quality is an important consideration for participants in loan syndicates that
are relatively uninformed compared to the lead arranger, while Hale and Santos (2008)
analyze the positive signal from using the same underwriter repeatedly in the loan market,
and also record those ﬁrms that may have issued private bonds prior to going public. This
tends to conﬁrm the more general conclusion of Faulkender and Petersen (2006) who ﬁnd
that more transparent ﬁrms obtain more debt than opaque ﬁrms.
Our paper builds on these foundations, but focuses on the public bond market. Motivated
by a conceptual model similar to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) we ﬁnd in our empirical
evidence that track record in public bond, private bond and loan markets increases the
likelihood of ﬁrms issuing in the public debt market taking all other things into account.
30Our results from a panel of 983 US ﬁrms from 1995-2004 shows that ﬁrms with a strong
market implied bond rating and a history of previous issuance have a higher probability
of issuing bonds even after controlling for creditworthiness, loan history and private bond
issuance than ﬁrms without this record. This result is robust to a large number of alternative
speciﬁcations. The contribution to the literature is, ﬁrst, to show that this record is one of
the most important inﬂuences on the decision to issue bonds, and, second, that other forms
of veriﬁcation from the loan market and private bond issues continue to inﬂuence the decision
to issue public bonds even in the presence of the bond market signal. It may also explain
why ﬁrms are willing to incur costs to build a good track record, since a seasoned issuer
with high-grade bonds is less likely to ﬁnd itself shut out of the bond market (Passov (2003);
Erel et al. (2012)) in diﬃcult times. The evidence in this paper and other literature we have
cited is beginning to stack up. This poses an interesting challenge for theorists who might
formulate truly dynamic models in which the value of the reputational gain has an inﬂuence
on the market value of the ﬁrm, creating an incentive for ﬁrms to invest in signals of quality
as a means to access market ﬁnance at lower cost.
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6 Appendix
A simple stylized model (not for publication)
We develop a simple stylized framework that is similar to models that study the role of
net worth in the choice between alternative modes of ﬁnance as for example in Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997), Repullo and Suarez (2000), Hoshi et al. (1993). We borrow from the
insights of this earlier work to motivate our assumptions. In our model ﬁrms have incentives
to seek ﬂexibility in ﬁnance due to the constraints on liquidity internally and the beneﬁts
of diversiﬁcation of ﬁnancial sources as in Rajan (1992). Firms will ﬁnd they are unable
to obtain suﬃcient ﬁnance from retained proﬁts to proceed with investment projects and
the scale of the ﬁnance required will create incentives to the ﬁrm to obtain bond market
ﬁnance. Thus for large investment projects ﬁrms will prefer to tap the public bond market
and there is a choice between bank or market ﬁnance, driven by diﬀerences in the cost of
ﬁnance between the two.
In our model we address repeated access to bond markets with a critical role for building
“reputation” of quality through successful repeat issues. Since our main goal is to illus-
trate the role of quality signals on market ﬁnance we study a two period model in which
the outcome of the ﬁrst period inﬂuences the ﬁnancing outcome of the subsequent period
introducing a role for quality signals.29 We now describe the key elements of the model. The
exposition, notation and main building blocks are similar to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
Corporate sector. There is a continuum of ﬁrms each of which is characterized by
the amount of net worth A. The set of all ﬁrms is described by a cumulative distribution
function F(A). Firm owners are risk neutral. The owner of the ﬁrm has available an
investment project that costs I to implement. Projects can be undertaken at any scale,
i.e. I 2 [0;+1). The ﬁrms’ net worth, A is such that 0 < A < I, and can be used to
ﬁnance the project (or used for consumption). The project has the following characteristics.
It succeeds with probability p generating a return R(I) = RI (i.e. proportional to I), and
fails with probability 1   p generating zero income. The probability of success p depends
on whether the ﬁrm owner manages the project diligently. Consequently, p = ph if the ﬁrm
owner manages the project to the best of her abilities, and p = pl < ph otherwise. In the
latter case the ﬁrm owner enjoys a private beneﬁt. We assume the owner can choose between
a project with a high probability of success, ph that yields no private beneﬁt, and a project
29With two periods, the link between them is that ﬁnance in the second period depends on the outcome
of the ﬁrst period i.e. whether the project is successful and the return to the bond holder is positive. If this
is the case ﬁnance is made available in the second period. This introduces a role for building “reputation”
from quality signals because repeat issuance occurs when a ﬁrm does not default on the bond in the earlier
periods. Moreover ﬁrm characteristics are also important since initial access to ﬁnance depends on whether
the net worth of the ﬁrm exceeds some cutoﬀ level.
34with a low probability of success, pl that yields a private beneﬁt. The private beneﬁt is
proportional to investment scale I, that is, (B(I) = BI;b(I) = bI)withB > b > 0 and is
private information to the ﬁrm owner. All other details of the economic environment are
common knowledge between all parties.
Financial sector. There is a continuum of lenders. Lenders can either be bond holders
(investors) or intermediaries (banks).30 Lenders are risk neutral. Because of perfect com-
petition among lenders, ﬁrms face a perfectly elastic supply of funds and lenders just break
even, that is, zero expected proﬁts.
Financing projects. Given A < I the ﬁrm needs to raise I   (A   c) from investors
(through directly placed issues) or I  A from intermediaries (intermediated ﬁnance), where
c is a ﬁxed cost assumed to be independent of issue size. We assume that bond holders
(collectively deﬁned as the “market”) demand an expected rate of return equal to rm. Inter-
mediaries demand a rate of return per unit loaned equal to rb  rm. We can motivate the
assumption that rb  rm with monitoring costs faced by intermediaries. In our context this
takes the form of resources spent (e.g. labor costs) on monitoring the ﬁrm’s management.31
An implication of monitoring is that banks can reveal whether the ﬁrm is b or B type. On
the other hand, c captures the (ﬁxed) underwriters’ fees that are normally associated with
public debt issues. For our purposes the assumptions on the cost of ﬁnance (rm;rb;c) create
a choice between bank or market ﬁnance. For relatively small ﬁnancing needs ﬁrms are most
likely to use a bank in order to avoid the ﬁxed cost, while for large scale ﬁnance issuing
directly is preferable.
Beliefs and track record. We now come to the role of track record in various ﬁnancial
markets. In contrast to intermediaries, investors only observe the ﬁrms’ success or failure
but not the private beneﬁt (B or b). They form (and update) a belief–equivalently a rating–
about ﬁrm reliability based on this information. Formally, the bond holder has (in period
1) a prior belief about ﬁrm type (b or B). This is given by a probability equal to  that the
ﬁrm is the b-type (high-reliability), and 1    that is the B-type (low-reliability). Investors
of course prefer high reliability borrowers since they are more likely to manage their projects
competently if oﬀered identical compensation to the low reliability ones. As we shall see
the belief about the quality of the ﬁrm can be updated using ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, loan
histories, and market information from ratings and past issuance.32
This information has been shown by Suﬁ (2007, 2009) to help a ﬁrm gain access to less well
informed investors, and draws on the same reasoning from the same Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997) framework that we use here. In particular, Suﬁ argues that intermediaries and the
loan rating agencies act as informed investors that can send signals to less informed investors,
such as those in the public debt markets. The intermediaries and rating agencies certify that
projects have been successful and conﬁrming the quality of the borrower, through updating
of information on default risk. They also monitor the project by deciding on whether to
invoke covenant requirements, changing or seizing the collateral posted to the project and
so on.
We now describe the sequence of events. There are two periods as described in Figure
2. In period 1 the ﬁrm owner seeks ﬁnance from lenders to undertake the project. If the
project succeeds, the ﬁrm owner receives RE and the bond holder (or intermediary) RL, where
R(I) = RE +RL. If the project fails each receive zero (i.e. we assume limited liability). The
project has a positive net present value (NPV) when the ﬁrm owner manages diligently but
30We use the terms investor and bond holder interchangeably.
31A higher cost of bank ﬁnance can also be rationalized with auditing costs paid by banks to verify project
returns (in the spirit of Townsend (1979)). In our model however returns are veriﬁable, and we have chosen to
sidestep this additional source of adverse selection (i.e. project returns) that would not oﬀer any additional
insights.
32We refer to this indicator as a ‘rating’ in the remainder of the paper, but we have in mind a that wide
range of information is used to determine its value, including oﬃcial ratings, but also signals from other
sources.
35negative otherwise: phR   (1 + ri) > 0 > plR   (1 + rm) + B; i = m;b. For simplicity we
assume the parameters of the model, ph;pl;B;b;R;I;rb;rm;c are identical across periods.
Description of the solution. Our main objective is to illustrate the role of signals
of quality and their inﬂuence on the likelihood and scale of market ﬁnance.In what follows
therefore we focus on the implications of the model when ﬁrms opt for market ﬁnance. Given
our assumptions on bank ﬁnance, it is easy to show that both types will obtain ﬁnance from
banks and the B-type will never opt for market ﬁnance. Note that the structure of this
model is similar to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), with the addition of a second period.
However, we assume that the outcome (of ﬁnancing and investment) in any given period
does not specify anything (ﬁnancing and investment) for the subsequent period, that is we
assume ﬁnance is project speciﬁc. We can therefore solve the model as a game with period
by period maximization keeping track of the evolution of beliefs from lenders. Essentially
the assumptions we make imply the only link between the two periods is the ﬁrms’ track
record (success or failure), and the associated updating of the rating, . We use backward
induction to solve for a separating equilibrium in which the b-type ﬁrm manages the project
diligently while the B-type ﬁrm does not. The solution of the model determines the optimal
investment scale, I, the division of the project’s return between the borrower, RE, and
lender, RL and the level of net worth, A, that determines the mode of ﬁnance, i.e. market
or intermediated ﬁnance. We present the details of the solution in the Appendix. In the
remainder of this section we state the period 1 maximization problem of the b-type ﬁrm
and summarize the main results that we use below in the empirical sections. The period 2
maximization problem is identical (except for the rating  which is updated to ′ when the
ﬁrm has received market ﬁnance in period 1).




where, Ub = phRb
E  (1+rb)A;Um = phRm
E  (1+rb)A, denote the net utilities to the ﬁrms’
owner when the project receives intermediary and market ﬁnance respectively, subject to:





L = RI for i = m,b





E + bI for i =m,b
Participation constraints for the lender,
market ﬁnance: ph(RI  
bI
∆p
) + (1   )(pl(RI  
bI
∆p
))  (1 + rm)(I + c   A)
intermediary ﬁnance: ph(RI  
bI
∆p
)  (1 + rb)(I   A)
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) show that in equilibrium all the constraints will bind, the
ﬁrm will use its entire net worth into the project and the lenders will ﬁnance the rest, i.e.
I   A, I   (A   c) in the case of intermediary and market respectively. Using the lender’s
participation constraints we can compute the optimal investment level.
36Optimal investment scale.
(A   c)m = I (5)
Ab = I (6)





∆p)ph; deﬁne the multipliers on net worth and
 = ph + (1   )pl is the probability of success as perceived by the investor. Equations
(1) and (2) deﬁne the eﬀective technology the ﬁrm has available to implement investment
projects. Note the following. First, it is straightforward to verify that @m
@ > 0. Thus since 
rises with success a ﬁrm can ﬁnance a larger project with the same net worth, A in successive
periods. The dependence of m on  implies that m > b with certainty as long as lenders
observe successful ﬁnancing of projects and thus  rises over time. We now deﬁne the net
worth threshold that determines the source of ﬁnance that ﬁrms prefer.
Deﬁnition of net worth threshold. The threshold is computed as the solution, A = A
to the three equations,
Ub = Um; I = bA; I = m(A   c)
Insights. First note that given success in period 1, the updated rating is greater than
the initial rating, i.e. ′ > : Hence upon observing success the market attaches a greater
weight that it faces a high-reliability (b-type) ﬁrm. From the optimal investment scale under
market ﬁnance above, and the expression for m we can immediately see that likelihood of
market ﬁnance increases in net worth, A. Therefore high collateralized ﬁrms with strong
balance sheets have a higher likelihood of obtaining market ﬁnance.
The fact that m > 1 means that a ﬁrm can lever its net worth and m can be interpreted
as the multiplier (c.f. Tirole (2006), p.127). It is also useful to note that we can deﬁne
leverage as:
(m−1)A
A = m   1. Since @m
@ > 0, for the same value of net worth, ﬁrms can
increase the scale of their investment projects with an improvement in ratings, and demand
more market ﬁnance. Equivalently it implies that ﬁrms can increase their leverage with a
positive updating of their rating (that follows a successful outcome in the previous period).
There is a second eﬀect of the rating that operates on the threshold A. This is given by
@A
@ < 0. This means that the minimum amount of net worth for market ﬁnance decreases
with an improved rating. Therefore an improvement in the rating increases the probability
of issuing a bond to the market. We can therefore state the following.
The eﬀect of an improved rating (in the form of higher probability, ) has two eﬀects. The
ﬁrst (through the eﬀect on m) allows ﬁrms to increase their leverage and thus to secure more
ﬁnance from the market. This is analogous to the argument proposed by Faulkender and
Petersen (2006), who suggest that the volume of lending will increase on the supply-side as
perceived quality of the borrower improves, but also, since the price of debt is lower in markets
compared to loans from intermediaries that incur monitoring costs, the demand for debt may
also be higher. Boot et al. (2006) argue that a good quality signal (in the form of a rating)
could prove to be an ‘information equalizer’, enlarging the investor base and expanding the
ability to borrow. The second (through the eﬀect on A) implies that less well collateralized
ﬁrms can access a greater volume of market ﬁnance. This eﬀect is discussed by Cantor and
Packer (1996) and Boot et al. (2006) when they identify the role of ratings as a minimum
quality standard that allows certain types of investors to purchase securities. They cutoﬀ
between investment grade and sub-investment grade ratings is particularly important for
pension funds, savings and loans institutions and money market mutual funds, for example.
The combined eﬀect implies that the likelihood of obtaining market ﬁnance increases with
the perceived “reputation” of quality from a successful track record of previous bond issues.
37Details of the solution.We use backward induction to solve for a separating equilibrium
in which the b-type ﬁrm manages the project diligently while the B-type ﬁrm does not.
Period 2
There are two cases.
I. The project has failed in period 1. For simplicity we assume that there is no ﬁnance
available for a new project in period 2, since ﬁrms have used up all of their net worth, A,
into the period 1 project. The investor (or intermediary) has observed failure (F) in period
1 and so updates her beliefs according to the Bayes rule.33
II. The project has succeeded in period 1. Firms enter period 2 with net worth A and seek
ﬁnance for the period 2 project.34 For the ﬁrm owner to manage diligently upon receiving
ﬁnance, the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) has to be satisﬁed. In the case of the
B-type:
phRE  plRE + BI
and similarly for the b-type:
phRE  plRE + bI
Let ∆p = ph   pl. From the IC constraints above the minimum payoﬀ that preserves
incentives (i.e. the owner manages to the best of her abilities) is RE = f bI
∆p; BI
∆pg
Let ′ be the markets’ updated belief about type b ﬁrm in the second period given success







ph + pl(1   )
Note that given success in period 1, ′ > . We now calculate the expected payoﬀ to
the investor in order to derive the conditions necessary to extend ﬁnance and determine the
maximum investment scale I. There are two cases to consider.
II.a. RE = bI
∆p. From the incentive compatibility constraints, the b-type ﬁrm manages
well while the B-type does not. The expected payoﬀ to the bond holder is:
′ph(RI   bI
∆p) + (1   ′)(pl(RI   bI
∆p))
Thus for the project to receive ﬁnance the bond holder’s participation constraint (PC)
has to be satisﬁed.
′ph(RI   bI
∆p) + (1   ′)(pl(RI   bI
∆p))  (1 + rm)(I + c   A)
II.b. RE = BI
∆p. In this case both types manage well. The expected payoﬀ to the bond
holder is:
′ph(RI   BI
∆p) + (1   ′)(pl(RI   BI
∆p))
Thus for the project to receive ﬁnance the bond holder’s participation constraint (PC)
has to be satisﬁed.
′ph(RI   BI
∆p) + (1   ′)(pl(RI   BI
∆p))  (1 + rm)(I + c   A)
Note that we can eliminate bI
∆p < RE < BI
∆p, since the expected payoﬀ to the bond
holder is strictly less than that in case II.a. Similarly by appealing to the same argument of
dominance we can eliminate bI
∆p > RE or BI
∆p < RE.
We now state the following assumption.
A.1. ′ph(RI   bI
∆p) + (1   ′)(pl(RI   bI
∆p)) > (1 + rm)(I + c   A) > ph(RI   BI
∆p). This
assumption implies that we can also eliminate case II.b above, and that the project will be
ﬁnanced if it oﬀers at least RE = bI
∆p to the ﬁrms’ owner. It then follows that the lender





34We implicitly assume that initial net worth in period 2 equals initial net worth in period 1. One can
point out that some of the surplus from period 1 will be used to enhance second period net worth, thus
giving rise a role for retained earnings. We can abstract from this complication by assuming that the ﬁrm
distributes the surplus from the ﬁrst period project as dividends.
38receives, R  RE. Moreover, in this case the b-type manages well while the B-type does not
in period 2.
Period 1
Given that period 1 has identical parameters (except ) to period 2 we do not need
to repeat the analysis. The following assumption guarantees an equilibrium in which the
b-type manages well while the B-type does not in period 1 given optimal actions and beliefs
in period 2.
A.2. The incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed for the b-type (∆pRE  bI) but
violated for the B-type (∆pRE  BI). Further, the net expected payoﬀ to the B-type from
not managing well in both periods, is strictly greater than deviating in period 1 (i.e. manage
in period 1 and do not manage in period 2), that is,
plA + BI + plfpl(RE) + BI   Ag > phA + phfpl(RE) + BI   Ag
This assumption guarantees that the b-type manages well, while the B-type does not in
period 1 given optimal actions in period 2 for both types (i.e. b-type manages well, B-type
does not) and the rationality of the investors’ beliefs.
Optimal investment scale. We can now deﬁne the investment scale that will obtain
under the two diﬀerent modes of ﬁnance (intermediary (b) or market (m) ). We combine
the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) for the b-type ﬁrm (phRE  plRE +bI) with the
participation constraint (PC) constraint of the ﬁnancier (m,b),
(PCm) : ph(RI   bI
∆p) + (1   )(pl(RI   bI
∆p))  (1 + rm)(I + c   A)
(PCb) : ph(RI   bI
∆p)  (1 + rb)(I   A)
Solving the two equations above we get:
(A   c)m  I (1)
Ab  I (2)
Equations (1) and (2) deﬁne the eﬀective technology the ﬁrm has available to implement
investment projects. These two equations will be satisﬁed as strict equalities given perfect
competition among lenders.





∆p)ph; deﬁne the multipliers on net worth
and  = ph + (1   )pl is the probability of success as perceived by the investor. It is
also important to note that m > b with certainty as long as the outcome of ﬁnancing is
successful (i.e. the project succeeds) and the rating,  improves over time.
Equation (1) or (2) says that the ﬁrm can lever its net worth (A c) or A with multiplier
equal to i, i = m;b. We also note that ﬁrms must have positive net worth (A > 0) to
invest using bank ﬁnance and A > c using market ﬁnance.
Using (1) it is straightforward to verify that @m
@ > 0. Thus since  rises with success a
ﬁrm can ﬁnance a larger project with the same net worth, A in successive periods.
Deﬁnition of net worth threshold. We now calculate the net utility (after we subtract
the opportunity cost of internal funds) to the ﬁrm from ﬁnancing and undertaking the
project. This will allow us to deﬁne a threshold value for A = A such that for all A < A
ﬁrms prefer intermediary ﬁnance, whereas for all A  A ﬁrms prefer bond ﬁnance. Using
the zero proﬁt condition for the lender (phRL = (1 + rb)(I   A); under bank ﬁnance,RL =
(1+rm)(I +c A)under market ﬁnance) the net utility to the ﬁrm when using intermediary
(market) ﬁnance is given respectively by,
U
b = phRE   (1 + rb)A = ph(RI   RL)   (1 + rb)A = (phR   (1 + rb))I
U










39We state the following assumption.






 (1 + rm) > 0
The ﬁrst two inequalities guarantee that @Ui
@I > 0; i = m;b. Therefore the ﬁrm would
like to invest as much as possible. However, as equations (1) and (2) show, the scale of the
investment is limited by the participation constraints of the lender and incentive compati-
bility constraints of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst and last inequalities in A.3 also imply a positive net
present value (per unit of investment) irrespective of mode of ﬁnance. The threshold A is
deﬁned as the solution to the three equations below.
Ub = Um; I = bA; I = m(A   c)




(1 + rm))m   (phR   (1 + rb))b > (1 + rb)  
ph

(1 + rm) (4)




 (1 + rm) + (phR  
ph





 (1 + rm))m   (phR   (1 + rb))b +
ph
 (1 + rm)   (1 + rb)
(5)
Thus for A < A ﬁrms prefer bank ﬁnance, while ifA  A ﬁrms prefer to issue publicly.





 (1+rm) (1+rb) and   =
(
ph
 (1 + rm) + (phR  
ph
























Note that from A.3 and equation (4) it follows A > c. Therefore given that the term in
parenthesis is strictly positive it follows immediately that @A
@ < 0. Thus the threshold, A
falls with a better rating.
40Table 1
Summary Statistics
All Firms Issuers Non-Issuers Diﬀ. Good Record Poor Record Diﬀ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LEV 26.20 30.15 23.43 0.00 26.57 25.44 0.01
(19.35) (16.28) (20.80) (21.04) (15.96)
PROF 9.34 10.07 8.24 0.01 9.41 9.30 0.86
(8.72) (9.58) (7.08) (9.41) (7.28)
CAPEX 5.42 5.72 4.99 0.00 5.55 5.05 0.00
(5.28) (4.82) (5.56) (4.65) (5.55)
COV 18.29 8.49 34.21 0.00 13.04 28.55 0.00
(52.42) (19.92) (78.72) (37.65) (103.24)
S&P RATING 3.65 3.36 3.51 0.00 3.63 3.77 0.00
(1.06) (0.87) (1.04) (0.98) (1.08)
IMPLIED RATING 2.42 2.42 - - 2.13 2.45 0.00
(1.43) (1.43) (1.40) (1.43)
SIZE 10.01 10.71 9.52 0.00 10.66 10.47 0.00
(1.51) (1.27) (1.46) (1.29) (1.75)
COLL 4.09 4.76 3.59 0.00 4.51 3.81 0.00
(5.19) (5.61) (4.81) (5.23) (5.09)
AGE 32.29 40.67 29.97 0.00 44.24 35.20 0.00
(31.71) (32.11) (30.69) (32.60) (30.63)
GROWTH 0.12 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.10 0.14 0.00
(0.30) (0.22) (0.35) (0.27) (0.34)
Notes. The Table reports sample means with standard deviations in parentheses. The p-value of a test of the equality of means is
reported. The sample period is 1995-2004, the number of ﬁrms is 933 and the number of observations is 6587. Issuers are those
ﬁrms that issued a bond at any time during the sample period. Non-Issuers are those ﬁrms that never issued bonds in our sample
period. Steady quality are those ﬁrms whose implied bond rating has not been downgraded during the sample period. Not steady
quality are those ﬁrms whose implied bond rating has been downgraded at least once in the sample period. LEV : Total debt to total
assets. PROF : Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. CAPEX: Capital expenditures to total assets. COV : Earnings
before interest and taxes to total interest expenses. S&PRATING: Standard and Poor’s issuer rating. IMPLIED RATING:
Spread implied rating calculated as shown in footnote 17). SIZE: The logarithm of real total assets. COLL: Tangible assets over
total assets. AGE: The diﬀerence between the present year and the year of incorporation. GROWTH: Growth in sales.
41Table 2
BASELINE MODEL
Probit Marginal Eﬀects Probit Marginal Eﬀects
LEV 0.002 0.0001 0.003* 0.0002
(1.34) (1.82)
PROF 0.014*** 0.004 0.013*** 0.004
(3.68) (3.53)
COV -0.003** -0.001 -0.003** -0.001
(-2.30) (-2.07)
CAPEX 0.019*** 0.005 0.018*** 0.005
(3.38) (3.19)
SIZE 0.368*** 0.113 0.368*** 0.112
(16.29) (16.29)
BANKFIN -0.006* -0.001 -0.007** -0.001
(-1.78) (-2.04)
EQFIN -0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0001
(-1.15) (-1.31)








Notes. The Table reports the eﬀects of the variables listed on the probability to issue bonds by a
probit model, as shown in equation (3). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm
is a bond issuer, and zero otherwise. The marginal eﬀects evaluated at covariate means. Robust
z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Time-dummies and industry dummies were included in
the model. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total assets. PROF is the ratio of earnings before
interest and taxes to total assets. COV is measured as earnings before interest and taxes to total
interest expenses. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. SIZE denotes the
logarithm of real total assets. BANKFIN is deﬁned as short-term debt to total assets. EQFIN is
deﬁned as equities over total assets. RULE 144A is a dummy equal to one if the bond has been
issued in the private market under the 144A rule and zero otherwise. RELATIONSHIP is a dummy
which takes the value one if the ﬁrm has used the same lead manager in its loan deals more than one
time. LOAN YIELD is a dummy which takes the value one if all loans of the ﬁrm are classiﬁed as
investment grade and zero otherwise. All ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are lagged one period. * signiﬁcant
at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
42Table 3
Model with bond market signals
Probit Marginal Eﬀects Probit Marginal Eﬀects
LEV 0.005*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.002
(2.87) (3.33)
PROF 0.011*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.003
(2.93) (2.78)
COV -0.003** -0.001 -0.003** -0.001
(-2.23) (-1.98)
CAPEX 0.024*** 0.007 0.022*** 0.007
(4.29) (4.06)
SIZE 0.419*** 0.128 0.420*** 0.127
(17.71) (17.80)
STEADY RECORD 0.621*** 0.190 0.629*** 0.190
(11.46) (11.61)
BANKFIN -0.007** -0.002 -0.008** -0.002
(-2.18) (-2.42)








Notes. The Table reports the eﬀects of the variables listed on the probability to issue bonds by a
probit model, as shown in equation (4). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm
is a bond issuer, and zero otherwise. The marginal eﬀects are evaluated at covariate means. Robust
z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Time-dummies and industry dummies were included in
the model. STEADY QUAL is a dummy which is equal to one if ﬁrms’ bond implied rating has not
been downgraded in the sample and equal to zero otherwise. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total
assets. PROF is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. CAPEX is the ratio
of capital expenditures to total assets. SIZE denotes the logarithm of real total assets. BANKFIN is
deﬁned as short-term debt to total assets. RULE 144A is a dummy equal to one if the bond has been
issued in the private market under the 144A rule and zero otherwise. RELATIONSHIP is a dummy
which takes the value one if the ﬁrm has used the same lead manager in its loan deals more than
one time and zero otherwise. LOAN YIELD is a dummy which takes the value one if all loans of the
ﬁrm are classiﬁed as investment grade and zero otherwise. All ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are lagged one
period. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
43Table 4
Model with bond market signals
investment grade ratings
Probit Marginal Eﬀects Probit Marginal Eﬀects
LEV 0.005*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.002
(2.75) (3.20)
PROF 0.010*** 0.003 0.009** 0.003
(2.58) (2.40)
COV -0.003** -0.001 -0.003* -0.001
(-2.15) (-1.94)
CAPEX 0.023*** 0.007 0.021*** 0.006
(4.12) (3.89)
SIZE 0.406*** 0.124 0.406*** 0.122
(17.24) (17.26)
GOOD RECORD 0.662*** 0.195 0.670*** 0.195
(12.12) (12.27)
BANKFIN -0.007** -0.002 -0.008** -0.002
(-2.16) (-2.40)








Notes. The Table reports the eﬀects of the variables listed on the probability to issue bonds by
a probit model, as shown in equation (4). Only ﬁrms with investment grade implied ratings are
considered. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm is a bond issuer, and zero
otherwise. The marginal eﬀects are evaluated at covariate means. Robust z-statistics are reported in
the parentheses. Time-dummies and industry dummies were included in the model. GOOD QUAL
is a dummy which is equal to one if ﬁrms’ investment grade bond implied rating has not been
downgraded in the sample and equal to zero otherwise. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total
assets. PROF is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. CAPEX is the ratio
of capital expenditures to total assets. SIZE denotes the logarithm of real total assets. BANKFIN is
deﬁned as short-term debt to total assets. RULE 144A is a dummy equal to one if the bond has been
issued in the private market under the 144A rule and equal to zero otherwise. RELATIONSHIP is a
dummy which takes the value one if the ﬁrm has used the same lead manager in its loan deals more
than one time and equal to zero otherwise. LOAN YIELD is a dummy which takes the value one if
all loans of the ﬁrm are classiﬁed as investment grade and equal to zero otherwise. All ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variables are lagged one period. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
44Table 5
Excluding financials
Probit Marginal Eﬀects Probit Marginal Eﬀects
LEV 0.006*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.002
(2.59) (2.94)
PROF 0.015*** 0.004 0.013*** 0.004
(3.51) (3.23)
COV -0.004** -0.001 -0.003* -0.001
(-2.30) (-1.94)
CAPEX 0.025*** 0.007 0.023*** 0.007
(3.95) (3.65)
SIZE 0.419*** 0.125 0.427*** 0.125
(15.11) (15.46)
STEADY RECORD 0.600*** 0.182 0.621*** 0.186
(9.49) (9.83)
BANKFIN -0.008* -0.002 -0.007 -0.002
(-1.66) (-1.51)








Notes. The Table reports the eﬀects of the variables listed on the probability to issue bonds by a
probit model, as shown in equation (4). Financials are excluded from the estimated equation. The
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm is a bond issuer, and zero otherwise. The
marginal eﬀects are evaluated at covariate means. Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses.
Time-dummies and industry dummies were included in the model. STEADY QUAL is a dummy
which is equal to one if ﬁrms’ bond implied rating has not been downgraded in the sample and equal
to zero otherwise. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total assets. PROF is the ratio of earnings
before interest and taxes to total assets. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets.
SIZE denotes the logarithm of real total assets. BANKFIN is deﬁned as short-term debt to total
assets. RULE 144A is a dummy equal to one if the bond has been issued in the private market under
the 144A rule and equal to zero otherwise. RELATIONSHIP is a dummy which takes the value one
if the ﬁrm has used the same lead manager in its loan deals more than one time and equal to zero
otherwise. LOAN YIELD is a dummy which takes the value one if all loans of the ﬁrm are classiﬁed
as investment grade and equal to zero otherwise. All ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are lagged one period. *
signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
45Table 6
Including lagged firm rating
Probit Marginal Eﬀects Probit Marginal Eﬀects
LEV 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001
(1.52) (1.64)
PROF 0.007* 0.002 0.007 0.002
(1.65) (1.48)
COV -0.003** -0.001 -0.003* -0.001
(-1.99) (-1.77)
CAPEX 0.029*** 0.007 0.027*** 0.006
(4.48) (4.20)
SIZE 0.329*** 0.079 0.333*** 0.079
(11.93) (12.05)
STEADY RECORD 0.553*** 0.136 0.558*** 0.135
(9.12) (9.15)
S&PRATING-LAGGED -0.136*** -0.033 -0.119*** -0.028
(-3.96) (-3.44)
BANKFIN -0.006* -0.002 -0.007* -0.002
(-1.68) (-1.80)








Notes. The Table reports the eﬀects of the variables listed on the probability to issue bonds by
a probit model, as shown in equation (4) augmented with the lagged ﬁrm rating. The dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm is a bond issuer, and zero otherwise. The marginal
eﬀects are evaluated at covariate means. Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Time-
dummies and industry dummies were included in the model. STEADY QUAL is a dummy which
is equal to one if ﬁrms’ bond implied rating has not been downgraded in the sample and equal to
zero otherwise. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total assets. PROF is the ratio of earnings
before interest and taxes to total assets. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets.
SIZE denotes the logarithm of real total assets. BANKFIN is deﬁned as short-term debt to total
assets. SPRATING-LAGGED denotes the lagged Standard and Poor’s issuer rating. RULE 144A is
a dummy equal to one if the bond has been issued in the private market under the 144A rule and
equal to zero otherwise. RELATIONSHIP is a dummy which takes the value one if the ﬁrm has used
the same lead manager in its loan deals more than one time and equal to zero otherwise. LOAN
YIELD is a dummy which takes the value one if all loans of the ﬁrm are classiﬁed as investment
grade and equal to zero otherwise. All ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are lagged one period. * signiﬁcant at
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Figure 1: volume of US corporate bonds
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